

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 TEL AVIV 4511

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

Z.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH BEGIN: NEXT STEPS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

BEGIN SUMMARY. BEGIN SUGGESTS THAT SECRETARY INVITE DAYAN TO WASHINGTON TO PICK UP DISCUSSIONS AT POINT THEY WERE LEFT MARCH 22 WHEN DAYAN HAD TO RETURN HOME. THINKS IT IMPORTANT EXAMINE WITH US IN DETAIL IMPLICATIONS OF SOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S "NINE POINTS" CONCERNING HIS WEST BANK/GAZA PLAN. HE HAS NO SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE, BUT COMMITTED HIMSELF TO REVIEW BIDDING WITH HIS ASSOCIATES. BEGIN IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHAT SADAT TOLD PRESIDENT AND WHAT HE TOLD WEIZMAN RELATING TO WITHDRAWAL AND TO PALESTINIAN STATE. BEGIN SAYS SADAT INSISTED TO WEIZMAN THAT HE NEEDED A PUBLIC COMMITMENT FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO '67 LINES BEFORE HE COULD NEGOTIATE ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS. HE ALSO "REVERSED HIMSELF" OVERNIGHT ON PALESTINIAN STATE QUESTION BY INFORMING WEIZMAN AT SECOND MEETING THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SOME GAZANS, HE COULD NOT STICK TO HIS POSITION OF REJECTING AN INDEPENDENT STATE, BUT WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION OR A PALESTINIAN STATE LINKED TO JORDAN. BEGIN SUGGESTS THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO GO BACK TO SADAT

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ON THESE TWO POINTS TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED TO SADAT'S EARLIER COMMITMENTS. MEANWHILE, HE WARNS THAT WE MUST ALL BE VERY CAREFUL IN DEALING WITH A PERSONALITY AS QUIXOTIC AS SADAT. END SUMMARY.

1. I MET WITH BEGIN EARLY LAST EVENING (APRIL 3) AT HIS KNESSET OFFICE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR IN AN EFFORT TO

SMOKE OUT HIS VIEWS ON WHERE HE THINKS WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE. EVRON, AVNER AND DCM VIETS WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. BEGIN'S PHYSICAL CONDITION SEEMED REMARKABLY IMPROVED IN THE SEVERAL DAYS SINCE WE LAST MET. HIS COLOR IS BACK AS IS HIS ANIMATION; HE SPOKE AND ACTED MUCH MORE VIGOROUSLY; AND BY THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION HE WAS EVEN LAUGHING AND JOKING. HE ALSO APPEARED IN MUCH BETTER PSYCHOLOGICAL SHAPE. I HAD THE IMPRESSION HE FINALLY HAS COME TO GRIPS WITH HIMSELF AND THE DILEMMA HE FACES. GONE WAS HIS PLEADING TONE AND HIS PAINFULLY REPETITIVE LITANY OF OUR RECENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS. HE SEEMED ALMOST PHILOSOPHICAL IN HIS APPROACH TO OUR DIFFERENCES; HE WAS NEITHER COMBATIVE OR EXCESSIVELY ASSERTIVE DURING OUR CONVERSATION. THERE WAS EVEN THE FAINTEST HINT THAT HE MIGHT BE LOOKING AGAIN AT CERTAIN OF HIS WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS-- THOUGH IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY FAINT THAT VIETS DID NOT SHARE MY THRILL OF DISCOVERY.

3. I OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT WITH THE IMMINENT RETURN TO WASHINGTON OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY I WANTED TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS ON WHAT HE CONSIDERED LOGICAL NEXT STEPS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. WITHOUT HESITATION BEGIN RESPONDED HE WAS IN FAVOR OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND DAYAN (BY CLEAR IMPLICATION, IN WASHINGTON). I TOLD HIM I WAS CERTAIN DAYAN WOULD
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BE WELCOME. BEGIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY HAD SAID THAT THE POINTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS BRIEFING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A US PEACE PLAN, NOR HAD HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINTS DISCUSSED WITH HIM BY THE PRESIDENT IN SUCH A LIGHT. HOWEVER THEY WERE CHARACTERIZED, THEY WERE STILL IMPORTANT POINTS THAT HAD TO BE CONSIDERED AND THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BETWEEN US. (AS AN ASIDE, HE REMAINED CONCERNED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S FORMULATION HAD "COME OUT IN THE NEGATIVE", BUT HE DID NOT BELABOR THE POINT THIS TIME.) HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO ELABORATE AN AGREED "US-ISRAELI PLAN", BUT WE NEED TO TRY TO AGREE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT THE FOLLOWING WERE AMONG POINTS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DURING DAYAN'S VISIT: FIRST, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE IDF REMAINING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? WHAT WOULD BE THEIR TASK? THEN THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE PLEBISCITE ON WHICH WE HAVE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. HE WONDERED IF, IN FACT, WE COULD IRON THEM OUT. THIRDLY, WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS A FORMULATION ON ACCEPTANCE OF 242. HE REGRETTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD "BROUGHT A GOOD FORMULA BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTABLE."

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EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

4. I INTERRUPTED TO SAY I WANTED TO CLARIFY THIS LAST POINT. I HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT DAYAN AND YADIN HAD SAID WE HAD REJECTED THE LATEST ISRAELI DRAFT DECLARATION LANGUAGE. THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. RATHER THE LATEST ISRAELI FORMULATION, INCLUDING THE PHRASE "WITH ALL THE NEIGHBORING STATES," HAD BEEN TRIED OUT INFORMALLY BY BARAK AND DAYAN IN THE LAST OF OUR WASHINGTON MEETINGS. SECRETARY VANCE HAD SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD MEET SADAT'S NEEDS. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION. I SAID WE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ISRAELI WANTED US TO PRESENT THAT TEXT TO SADAT AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL. I SAID IF THIS WAS PRESENTLY THEIR DESIRE WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE HAPPY TO DO SO. IN NO SENSE, I SAID, DID WE REJECT THE DRAFT OR TRY TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY FOR EGYPT.

5. BEGIN DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY. HE SAID WITH A HALF-SMILE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT HE NOW KNOWS FROM EXPERIENCE THAT "EVERYTHING NOW DEPENDED ON EGYPT." IF THE EGYPTIANS GIVE THEIR APPROVAL TO PROPOSALS, THE U.S. ALSO CAN. THE CONVERSE IS EQUALLY TRUE; WHATEVER THE EGYPTIANS CANNOT BLESS, NEITHER CAN THE U.S. THEREFORE, THE GREAT ISSUE FOR HIM IS HOW TO APPROACH
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THE EGYPTIANS.

6. I TURNED BEGIN'S ATTENTION BACK TO HIS SUGGESTION OF A DAYAN VISIT BY ASKING IF HE HAD A PREFERENCE FOR TIMING. BEGIN SAID HE KNEW DAYAN PREFERRED NOT TO BE IN WASHINGTON DURING THE PERIOD OF BEGIN'S OWN FORTHCOMING VISIT. HE WOULD REACH THE U.S. ON APRIL 30 AND INTENDED TO STAY FOR SIX OR SEVEN DAYS TO PARTICIPATE IN VARIOUS CELEBRATIONS FOR ISRAEL'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY. EVRON INTERJECTED THAT DAYAN WAS COMMITTED TO A VISIT TO THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES DURING THE PERIOD MAY 7-17. (EVRON LATER CALLED TO SAY DAYAN ALSO MUST BE IN JERUSALEM APRIL 17-19 TO RECEIVE THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.) I SAID I THOUGHT IT MADE MORE SENSE FOR DAYAN TO GO TO WASHINGTON PRIOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. I FELT CONFIDENT THAT IF BEGIN THOUGHT IT WAS USEFUL FOR DAYAN AND THE SECRETARY TO REVIEW THE BIDDING, THE SECRETARY WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE HIM, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE SECRETARY'S OWN COMPLICATED SCHEDULE. BEGIN REPLIED THAT HE CERTAINLY HAD NO OBJECTION WHOULD WE PREFER TO SCHEDULE THE DAYAN VISIT PRIOR TO HIS OWN. WE LEFT IT THAT I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON AND THEN TALK WITH DAYAN WHEN HE RETURNS FROM ROMANIA LATER THIS WEEK.

7. TURNING TO WEIZMAN'S VISIT TO CAIRO, I SAID THAT I HAD ENJOYED A VERY GOOD TALK WITH WEIZMAN EARLIER IN THE DAY. HIS REPORT HAD DOVETAILED FAIRLY CLOSELY WITH WHAT MUBARAK HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR EILTS. NEVER ONE TO MISS A BET, BEGIN QUICKLY ASKED WHAT HAD MUBARAK TOLD US. I THEN SUMMARIZED SELECTIVELY FOR BEGIN THE ESSENTIALS OF CAIRO 09802, EMPHASIZING TO HIM THAT MUBARAK HAD BRIEFED AMBASSADOR EILTS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF NOTES. WHEN I CONCLUDED BEGIN OBSERVED THAT THE ACCOUNTS WERE REASONABLY SIMILAR. THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN
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NUANCE, BUT THIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE GIVEN THE FACT MUBARAK WAS SPEAKING FROM MEMORY. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW FOR ME WHAT HE TERMED "THE ESSENTIALS."

8. BEGIN SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM IN WASHINGTON (1) HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SADAT DOES NOT WANT A PALESTINAIN STATE, (2) SADAT DID NOT DEMAND TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 BORDERS. BEGIN SAID HE HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT, IF THIS IS SO, TO ASK SADAT TO PROPOSE MORE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FOR THE DECLARATION. UP TO THIS POINT THE EGYPTIANS HAD RETAINED THEIR MAXIMALIST POSITIONS IN ALL THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND DRAFTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT. HE WANTED TO HEAR STRAIGHT FROM THE EGYPTIANS THE SAME LANGUAGE THE PRESIDENT HAD HEARD. THE PRESIDENT HAD

PROMISED TO CLARIFY THIS WITH SADAT. I INTERRUPTED TO SAY I KNEW THE PRESIDENT HAD INDEED CONVEYED THIS POINT TO SADAT PRIOR TO WEIZMAN'S VISIT. BEGIN THEN SAID THAT WAS INTERESTING, BECAUSE SADAT HAD TOLD WEIZMAN ON THE FIRST DAY OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS THAT HE NEEDED A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CALLING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS. WEIZMAN CORRECTLY HAD REJECTED THIS ON THE SPOT. SADAT HAD SAID THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD INCLUDE THIS COMMITMENT IN A DECLARATION, THE EGYPTIANS WOULD IN TURN COMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE ALL OTHER PROBLEMS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. BUT SADAT HAD INSISTED ON A PRIOR ISRAELI COMMITMENT OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. BEGIN SIAD WHAT NEEDS TO BE MADE CLEAR TO SADAT IS THAT THIS APPROACH IS IN ITSELF "AN OBSTACLE TO THE PEACE PROCESS." NEITHER THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT NOR ANY OPPOSITION LEADER COULD EVER AGREE TO SUCH A DECLARATION. THERE IS ALMOST TOTAL NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THIS POINT.

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9. BEGIN WONDERED WHY SADAT SEEMED CONSTANTLY TO "MAKE HIMSELF A LITTLE DEAF." HE SAID HE HEARS ONLY WHAT HE WANTS TO. TEN DAYS BEFORE SADAT CAME TO JERUSAELM, BEGIN SAID, HE HAD MADE A SPEECH IN THE KNESSET TURNING DOWN SADAT'S DEMAND FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. SUBSEQUENTLY THERE WAS DEBATE IN THE KNESSET. HE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT SADAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF IT. BUT WHEN SADAT CAME TO JERUSALEM HE REPEATED HIS DEMANDS AND BEGIN AGAIN HAD ANSWERED HIM. SO HAD OPPOSITION LEADER PERES. BUT SADAT CONTINUED TO RAISE THE SAME OLD POINTS TIME AND AGAIN "AS IF THERE IS

A POSSIBILITY WE WILL CHANGE OUR MINDS."

10. I SOUGHT TO CLARIFY PRECISELY WHAT SADAT HAD SAID WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, SINCE BEGIN'S VERSION WAS NOT PRECISELY THE ONE WEIZMAN HAD GIVEN ME EARLIER IN THE DAY. (SEPTEL). BEGIN REPEATED THAT SADAT HAD TOLD WEIZMAN IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD GIVE HIM A DECLARATION ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 LINES, THE EGYPTIANS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS LATER. WEIZMAN HAD SAID THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. I ASKED IF THE PHRASEOLOGY OF SUCH A DECLARATION WERE QUALIFIED TO STATE
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"SUBJECT TO MODIFICATIONS AS REQUIRED FOR SECURITY REASONS" OR SOMETHING SIMILAR, WOULD THAT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE? BEGIN EMPHATICALLY RESPONDED NO. THERE WILL BE NO COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD BE UNWARRANTED AND UNJUST. IT WAS A DEMAND ONE MADE ON A DEFEATED NATION, WHICH ISRAEL WAS NOT. AS A RESULT OF THE SADAT-WEIZMAN CONVERSATION, HE SAID, IT IS NOW CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT SADAT DEMANDS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 LINES. THERE CAN BE NO FUTHER MISTAKE ON THIS. BEGIN WONDERED IF PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP THIS SUBJECT AGAIN WITH SADAT.

1. BEGIN THEN MOVED ON TO HIS SECOND PRINCIPAL POINT RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY UPSET OVER THE FACT THAT AT THE FIRST SADAT-WEIZMAN MEETING SADAT HAD SAID HE DID NOT WANT A PALESTINAIN STATE; THEN OVERNIGHT, AFTER CONSULTING WITH SOME GAZANS, HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND TOLD WEIZMAN HIS STATEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS DAY NO LONGER STOOD. BY NOT IT SHOULD BE CLEAR EVEN TO SADAT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE CONVINCED THAT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE O JUDEA AND SAMARIA, EVEN IF AMENDED BY "A LINK WITHJORDAN", WILL LEAD TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT HAD TO REALIZE THAT WHEN HE BEGINS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA THEY REPRESENT A MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR ISRAEL. CONTINUING, BEGIN SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO GO MORE INTO DETAILS AT OUR MEETING, BUT THAT ISRAEL REMAINED READY TO NEGOTIATE ON ANYTHING. HE AHD TOLD THE KNESSET THAT HE CONSIDERED IT A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER PUBLICLY STATED THE IDF COULD REMAIN IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT WE HAD IN
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MIND.. SIMILARLY, HE WOULD WISH TO TALK WITH US FURTHER ABOUT OUR CONCEPT OF THE PLEBISCITE FOR THE AREA. COULD WE ENVISAGE THE RESULTS OF PLEBISCITE LASTING FOR AN UNLIMITED PERIOD, FOR EXAMPEL. PAUSING, HE SAID "BUT WE CAN'T BE RUSHED. WE WANT TO DISCUSS THESE THINGS IN DETAIL."

12. BEGIN THEN RETURNED TO A RECITATION OF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT SADAT'S DEPENDABILITY. HE SAID ONE MUST ASSUME THAT PRIOR TO WEIZMAN'S VISIT SADAT HAD STUDIED HIS BRIEFING PAPERS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW COULD HE HAVE SO SUDDENLY CHANGED HIS MIND? BEGIN LAUGHINGLY ADDED "AND THEN HE SAYS HE ALWAYS KEEPS HIS WORD--THAT HE ONLY PROMISES WHAT HE CAN DELIVER." BEGIN MARVELLED OVER HOW AN OVERNIGHT TALK WITH SOME UNKNOWN GAZANS COULD HAVE SO SUDDENLY CHANGED SADAT'S MIND ON THE SUBJECT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. BECOMING SERIOUS, HE SAID THAT THIS TYPE OF BEHAVIOR WORRIED THE ISRAELIS VERY MUCH. HE HAD PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED SADAT'S QUIXOTIC NATURE AFTER ISMAILIA. HE HAD THOUGHT HE AND SADAT HAD REACHED A GENUINE MEETING OF THE MINDS DURING THEIR ISMAILIA TALKS. BUT SUDDENLY SADAT HAD CHANGED COURSE. SEVERAL DAYS LATER HE HAD SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN BEGIN EVERYTHING AND THAT BEGIN HAD GIVEN HIM NOTHING IN RETURN. NOW THE SAME THING HAS HAPPENED. OVERNIGHT SADAT HAS ONCE AGAIN CHANGED HIS MIND. HIS PROPOSAL OF YESTERDAY

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DID NOT STAND TODAY.

13. I ASKED IF HE COULD ENLIGHTEN ME ON WHAT PRECISELY SADAT'S NEW PORPOSAL WAS. BEGIN SAID QUITE SIMPLY IT WAS A PALESTINE STATE LINKED WITH JORDAN. DERISIVELY, BEGIN ASKED WHAT DID SADAT HAVE IN COMMON WITH JUDEA AND SAMARIA--OR FOR THAT MATTER WITH GAZA. WEIZMAN HAD CORRECTLY ANSWERED SADAT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA FOR 11 YEARS. WE ALSO HAVE A LINK, HE NOTED. BEGIN WONDERED IF SADAT HAD DESIGNS ON JUDA AND SAMARIA. I ASKED IF THE TALKS HAD RELATED TO TERRITORY OR TO DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORY. BEGIN SAID THIS WAS REALLY NOT CLEAR. BARAK'S NOTES HAD ALSO BEEN DONE ONLY FROM MEMORY. BUT THE FACT WAS THAT WITHIN THE SPACE OF 24 HOURS A MAN WHO RULES EGYPT ON MATTERS WHICH AFFECTED "OUR VERY LIVES" HAD CHANGED HIS MIND. BEGIN AGAIN ASKED THAT I NOFORM THE PRESIDENT OF THIS TURNABOUT. HENCEFORTH, HE SAID, ISRAEL MUST NOW WEIGH CAREFULLY EVERY WORD SADAT UTTERS. IN ANY CASE, HE CONTINUED, SADAT WOULD LIKE TO SEE WEIZMAN AGAIN. HE LIKES WEIZMAN AND "HE IS ANGRY WITH ME. BUT WHAT CAN I DO ABOUT IT?" IN ANY CASE, HE SAID HE NOW UNDERSTQNDNS BETTER WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER THE LAST
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SEVERAL MONTHS (TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP.)

14. RETURNING YET AGAIN TO SADAT'S "CHANGE OF MIND" IN HIS WEIZMAN MEETING, BEGIN SUGGESTED THAT "ALL OF US" NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN OUR DEALINGS WITH SADAT. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED ME TO WARN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY THAT WE SHOULD ALL PROCEED CAREFULLY IN LIGHT OF SADAT'S UNSTEADY COURSE. HE SAID KISSINGER HAD TOLD HIM IN WASHINGTON THAT SADAT TENDED TO CREATE ILLUSIONS ABOUT HIMSELF. BUT WHATEVER THE NATURE OF THE MAN, BEGIN OBSERVED, WE ALL HAD TO DEAL WITH HIM.

"HE IS THE RULER AND NOBODY DARES OPEN HIS MOUTH IN FRONT OF HIM."

15. IN AN EFFORT TO TRY TO GET BEGIN TO SUM UP WHERE WE STOOD, I ASKED IF HE HAD ANY NEW THOUGHTS OR NEW IDEAS WHICH DAYAN COULD CARRY TO WASHINGTON DURING HIS REVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY. BEGIN REPLIED ONLY THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD DISCUSS THIS AND BE BACK IN TOUCH. IN PASSING, HE OBSERVED THAT THE IDEA OF A PLEBISCITE HAD ALSO BEEN REJECTED BY PERES. HE QUOTED BARAK AS HAVING TOLD SADAT IN CAIRO: "WHY SHOULD WE NOT LEAVE IT OUT? IF WE CREATE NEW REALITIES, LET THEM SPEAK FOR

THEMSELVES."

15. AS WE STARTED TO LEAVE I NOTED THAT WEIZMAN HAD TOLD ME THERE HAD BEEN NO TALKS ON SINAI. BEGIN SAID THAT WAS CORRECT SO FAR AS THE SADAT TALKS WENT, BUT THAT WEIZMAN AND GAMASY HAD BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT. GAMASY HAD NOTED THAT IF THE ISRAELI SETTLERS WANTED TO STAY THEY COULD BECOME CITIZENS OF EGYPT. BEGIN SAID HE ASSUMED THEY WILL ALL WANT TO LEAVE AND HE
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LAUGHINGLY TERMED THIS "INDIRECT DISMANTLEMENT."
AS WE PARTED HE TOOK ME BY THE ARM AND SAID THIS HAD BEEN AN EXTREMELY USEFUL SESSION FOR HIM. FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAD REALLY FELT HE COULD TALK EASILY AND DISPASSIONATELY ABOUT SADAT. HIS EMOTIONS HAD BEEN BOTTLED UP FOR MONTHS. SUDDENLY, TODAY, FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAD BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND THE MAN.
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